Side-Channel Attacks in Multi-Tenant Cloud Environments: Prevention & Mitigation

Atharv  Pandit; Rakesh  Pandit

doi:10.69968/ijisem.2025v4i293-105

Authors

Atharv Pandit Research Scholar
Rakesh Pandit Assistant Professor -Computer Science & Engineering Medicaps University.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.69968/ijisem.2025v4i293-105

Keywords:

Side-Channel Attacks, Cloud Security, Multi-Tenant Environments, Cache Attacks, Machine Learning, Anomaly Detection, Confidential Computing

Abstract

Multi-tenant cloud environments are increasingly vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs), which exploit shared resources such as caches, memory, and CPU scheduling to extract sensitive data from co-located virtual machines (VMs). These attacks pose a significant security threat, particularly in cloud computing scenarios where resource isolation is challenging. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of side-channel attack techniques, including cache-based attacks, power analysis, and timing attacks, and their impact on cloud infrastructure. To mitigate these risks, we propose a multi-layered prevention and mitigation framework integrating real-time anomaly detection, encryption-based obfuscation, and hardware-level defenses. Our approach leverages machine learning-based behavioral anomaly detection, homomorphic encryption for secure computations, and cache partitioning strategies to minimize cross-VM interference. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework effectively detects and mitigates side-channel threats with an accuracy of 97.3% in identifying malicious activities using anomaly detection. Furthermore, cache partitioning reduces data leakage by up to 85%, and encryption-based obfuscation introduces less than 5% computational overhead compared to traditional security mechanisms. These findings validate the feasibility of our approach in enhancing cloud security while maintaining system performance. This research contributes to strengthening the security posture of cloud service providers (CSPs) by offering a proactive, adaptive, and efficient defense mechanism against emerging side-channel attacks. Future work will focus on refining adaptive machine learning models and integrating confidential computing paradigms to further enhance cloud security.

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